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This paper looks at the experience of South East Europe which – for the purposes of this 
paper – includes the former states of Yugoslavia except for Slovenia (i.e. Croatia, Serbia-
Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia), Albania, and the two EU candidate 
countries, Bulgaria and Romania. For all these economies, accession to the EU will be the 
overriding driving force of the policy-making agenda for the foreseeable future, albeit with 
widely different time horizons in the individual economies. In Part One we describe the 
South East European (SEE) ‘region’ as one which has over the 1990s significantly ‘fallen 
behind’ in the process of economic development relative to the group of Central and 
Eastern European (CEE) economies which will join the EU in 2004. While developments 
are somewhat heterogeneous, there is, in particular, an abysmal employment record which 
has not even started to turn around, as well as an extremely bad productivity and export 
performance. In Part Two, we discuss in greater detail the conditions required to move 
towards a sustained growth and catching-up process. We analyse the problematic states 
of transition in some of the SEE economies as well as the basic disequilibria (fiscal, 
external, labour markets) which need to be resolved for sustained development to take 
place. The prospects of making up for the lost decade and dealing with the unresolved 
disequilibria will be a crucial issue in evaluating the prospects of EU accession some time 
in the future. We discuss the stumbling blocks both from the SEE side and the EU side in 
developing a clear perspective of integration with the EU. 
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This paper looks at the experience of South East Europe which – for the purposes of this 
paper – includes the former states of Yugoslavia except for Slovenia (i.e. Croatia, Serbia-
Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia), Albania, and the two EU candidate 
countries, Bulgaria and Romania. For all these economies, accession to the EU will be the 
overriding driving force of the policy-making agenda for the foreseeable future, albeit with 
widely different time horizons in the individual economies. The reason we treat this 
collection of countries as a ‘group’ is precisely the fact that for more than any other set of 
economies (with the possible exception of Turkey) the EU accession agenda will be 
dominant both in the countries themselves as well as in the way the outside world will view 
this ‘region’ over the coming years. 
 
The paper discusses the prospects for further South East European EU enlargement in 
two parts: in Part One we describe the South East European (SEE) ‘region’ as one that 
has over the 1990s ‘fallen behind’ in the process of economic development relative to the 
group of Central and Eastern European (CEE) economies which have become (together 
with the Baltic states and Malta and Cyprus) the ‘first round’ transition economies, which 
will join the EU in 2004. This pattern of 'falling behind' was clearly visible as regards GDP 
growth, an abysmal employment record which has not even started to turn around, and an 
extremely bad productivity and export performance. External economic relations reveal 
behind a fragile current account situation very weak commodity trade balances and either 
a strong reliance on transfers from abroad or an excess reliance on sectors (tourism) which 
can have negative structural and exchange rate implications. We have shown that the 
export structure is clearly very different from the more successful transition economies, i.e. 
a strong dependence on export commodities that rely mostly on unskilled labour and low 
technology inputs. The CEE economies have, on the other hand, made strong inroads into 
medium-/high-skill and medium-/high-tech industries in their exports to the EU markets. 
The prospects of making up for this lost decade will be a crucial issue in evaluating the 
prospects of further EU accession.  
 
In  Part Two, we discuss in greater detail the conditions required to move towards a 
sustained growth and catching-up process. We analyse the problematic states of transition 
in some of the SEE economies as well as the basic disequilibria (fiscal, external, labour 
markets) which need to be resolved for sustained development to take place. We look at 
the development of foreign debt, which may prove to be an important constraint on growth, 
given the weak export performance. In most cases, foreign debt is growing faster than 
GDP and in some cases it is approaching the upper limit of sustainability. We analyse the 
fiscal sector and find that public expenditures, with some exceptions, tend to be high as is 
the case with the budget deficits too. Also, the state spends a lot on wages and salaries 
and on subsidies and transfers. That points to the conclusion that the public sector is still iii 
quite unreformed, at least in most cases. Finally, we discuss the stumbling blocks both 
from the SEE side and the EU side in developing a clear perspective of integration with the 
EU. We discuss a number of ways in which the process of integration could be speeded 
up. 
 
In conclusion, transition has meant divergence for the SEE countries. They have not 
succeeded in improving their competitiveness and have not moved on to a path of 
sustainable growth. The situation has been improving since 2000, but the return of growth 
has been accompanied by a persistence of macroeconomic disequilibria. Also, in most 
cases, growth has been driven by consumption rather than by investment and exports. 
Thus, there are still considerable problems on the way to convergence. These would be 
easier to address if the process of EU integration was speeded up. The SEE countries are 
quite dependent on the EU both economically and politically. Thus, unlike in other cases 
where convergence preceded integration, the opposite strategy may be the preferred one 
in South East Europe. 
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Prospects for further (South-) Eastern EU enlargement:  
from divergence to convergence? 
Introduction 
This paper looks at the experiences of South East Europe which – for the purposes of this 
paper – includes the former states of Yugoslavia except for Slovenia (i.e. Croatia, Serbia-
Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia), Albania, and the two EU candidate 
countries, Bulgaria and Romania. For all these economies, accession to the EU will be the 
overriding driving force of the policy-making agenda for the foreseeable future, albeit with 
widely different time horizons in the different economies. The reason we treat this collection 
of countries as a ‘group’ is precisely the fact that for more than any other set of economies 
(with the possible exception of Turkey) the EU accession agenda will be dominant both in 
the countries themselves as well as in the way the outside world will view this ‘region’ over 
the coming years. 
 
The paper discusses the prospects for further South-East European EU Enlargement in 
two parts: in Part One we describe the South East European (SEE) ‘region’ as one which 
has over the 1990s ‘fallen behind’ in the process of economic development relative to the 
group of Central and Eastern European (CEE) economies which have become (together 
with the Baltic states and Malta and Cyprus) the ‘first round’ transition economies which will 
join the EU in 2004. The prospects of making up for this lost decade will be a crucial issue 
in evaluating the prospects of further EU accession. In Part Two, we discuss in greater 
detail the conditions required to move towards a sustained growth and catching-up 
process. We analyse the problematic states of transition in some of the SEE economies as 
well as the basic disequilibria (fiscal, external, labour markets) which need to be resolved 
for sustained development to take place. We also discuss the stumbling blocs both from 
the SEE side and the EU side in developing a clear perspective of integration with the EU. 
 
 
Part One  
South-East Europe versus Central and Eastern Europe:  
the track record so far 
As indicated in the introduction, in this part we shall contrast the economic development of 
the SEE region with that of the ‘first round’ transition economies of Central and Eastern 
Europe (the CEE economies). Table 1 presents some basic data regarding size of the 
different economies, their GDP per capita levels (both at current exchange rates and in 
purchasing power parity) and, finally, the level of the respective GDPs in relation to the 
1990 levels. We can see that there is a lot of heterogeneity within both groups according to 
most of the indicators. Starting with the size variable, we can see that there are two   2
economies, one within each group, Romania in the SEE group and Poland in the CEE 
group which account for a very substantial share of the region (more in population than in 
GDP). In most of the following diagrams when we present some summary information 
about the two regions, we shall therefore exclude these two big entities from the two 
regions and present their developments separately, so that the respective regional 
developments will not be completely dominated by these two economies. 
 
Table 1 
Basic indicators 2002 
  Population  GDP  GDP pc  GDP pc  real GDP 
  persons mn  EUR mn  EUR  USD at PPP  1990=100 
Albania 
1) 2)  3.1  4,908  1,590  4,000  123.3 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 
3) 4)  3.8  5,574  1,475  6,400  . 
Bulgaria 
5)  7.8  16,668  2,125  8,250  87.9 
Croatia 
1)  4.4  23,820  5,368  10,030  92.9 
Macedonia 
1) 5)  2.0  3,916  1,925  6,520  87.3 
Romania  22.4  48,384  2,161  6,590  92.3 
Serbia-Montenegro 
2) 6)  8.3  14,000  1,679  4,500  52.8 
Czech Republic  10.2  73,855  7,248  15,740  107.2 
Hungary 
5)  10.2  65,852  6,487  13,550  115.6 
Poland  38.6  199,549  5,168  10,510  146.5 
Slovakia  5.4  25,144  4,675  12,820  111.6 
Slovenia 
5)  2.0  22,367  11,208  18,530  127.4 
Notes: 1) Population data 2001. - 2) Est. GDP p.c. USD PPP 2002. - 3) Population data 2000.- 4) Est. GDP p.c. USD 
PPP 2001. - 5) Projected GDP, EUR million 2002. - 6) Real GDP growth is based on Gross Material Product (GMP). 
Source: wiiw Database.  
 
Apart from size, we can see two well-known features characterizing South East Europe: 
firstly, the region – with the exception of Croatia – has a level of GDP per capita which is 
significantly below that of the CEE region; secondly, an important reason (in the case of 
some countries, the exclusive reason) for this developmental gap is the loss in output after 
1990.  It is clear that the 1990s – we shall see that over the past two to three years this 
tendency has stopped – was a decade in which the SEE region has significantly ‘fallen 
behind’ the CEE region, and even more so behind the EU. 
 
Figs. 1 and 2 show the developments over the period 1990-2002: as mentioned above, in 
order not to swamp the regional figures by the two large economies, we present 
aggregates of CEE-4 (Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary and Slovenia) and of SEE-4 
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Figure 1 














Source: wiiw Database. 
 
Figure 2 















Source: wiiw Database.   4
(Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia and Serbia-Montenegro
1), as well as information about 
Romania and Poland separately. What emerges clearly with regard to GDP and 
employment developments is a confirmation of the ‘falling behind’ picture between SEE 
and CEE. While the CEE economies started a recovery from the ‘transformational 
recession’ after 1992/93, the SEE economies experienced a significantly deeper fall over 
the period 1989-1993 and after that there was basically stagnation until about 1999. There 
were periods of weak recoveries always interrupted by political and economic ruptures: 
war between Serbia and Croatia in 1991/92 (and again in 1995), a major banking and 
exchange rate crisis in Bulgaria in 1996, a banking crisis in Croatia in 1997, the collapse of 
the Albanian pyramid schemes in 1997, wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992-95, in Kosovo 
in 1999, and a civil war in Macedonia in 2001. If one could speak of some sustained 
growth period, it would be limited to the most recent, period 2000-2002; however, even 
over this period one can hardly detect a difference in the trend growth rates between the 
two regions: The CEE-4 grew by 3.4%, while the SEE-4, as well as Romania, grew by 
3.9% over that period. In this period, after a longer stretch with the highest growth rates, 
Poland grew only by a rate of 2.1%. Hence, while the ‘falling behind’ period seems to have 
come to an end, the ‘catching-up’ phase has barely begun. 
 
As regards aggregate employment levels (Fig. 2), the CEE region experienced a period of 
dramatic labour shake-out until about 1994, after which there was a strong recovery in 
Poland and a mild recovery in the CEE-4, followed by further gradual declines in employment 
levels (a number of these economies experienced further macroeconomic recessions in the 
mid- or late 1990s). As compared to this picture, the SEE experienced deeper and sustained 
declines in employment levels throughout the period. In level terms, the CEE-4 were in 2001 
at 87% the 1990 level, while the SEE-4 were below 75%. Following up on the aggregate 
labour market situation, Table 2 provides two estimates of unemployment rates (by 
registration and according to Labour Force Surveys, the latter regarded as more reliable and 
internationally more comparable), as well as of the economic activity rates (i.e. active labour 
force in total working age population): we can see that the SEE region includes countries 
with extremely low activity rates (Bulgaria, Croatia) as well as two countries with very high 
activity rates, Romania and Albania. Apart from Romania, the revealed unemployment rates 
in the SEE region are high and there is evidence that the figures hide substantial ‘disguised 
unemployment’. The more recent unemployment figures for the CEE region are more 
reliable as they follow periods in which reforms of unemployment insurance schemes and 
employment exchanges, as well as improvements in unemployment and employment 
registers have already taken place; the two measures of unemployment are much closer for 
the CEE region which is in stark contrast to the strongly diverging numbers for the SEE 
region. An additional issue which characterizes the differences in the employment situation in 
the two regions are the much higher estimates for the SEE region of the ‘black’ or ‘grey 
                                                                 
1   For Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina the existing data are too patchy to allow comparisons.   5
economy’. The labour market situation and the role of the informal economy will be further 
discussed at greater length in Part Two of this paper. 
 
Table 2 
Labour market indicators, 2002 
       Unemployment rate  Econ. activity rate 
1) 
  registered,  





2)  .  66.1
3) 
Bosnia - Herzegovina  40.0
2)  .  . 
Bulgaria  16.3  17.8  49.4 
Croatia  21.5  14.8  50.9 
Macedonia  .  31.9  52.6 
Romania  8.1  8.4  57.1 
Serbia & Montenegro  31.2  13.8  56.3 
Czech Republic  9.8  7.3  59.9 
Hungary  8.0  5.8  52.9 
Poland  18.1  19.9  55.4 
Slovakia  17.5  18.5  60.2 
Slovenia  11.3  6.4  57.5 
Notes: 1) Labour force in % of working age population 15+. - 2) 2001. - 3) 2000. 
Source: wiiw Database, CANSTAT statistic bulletin 2002/4, IMF, national Labour Force Survey (LFS) statistics. 
 
The next point is the abysmal performance of the SEE region in exports. Fig. 3 presents the 
developments in total exports for the two regions over the transition period and we can see 
that there was absolute stagnation in aggregate exporting activity in SEE throughout the 
period, while there was substantial growth in CEE. Over the most recent period there has 
been some modest growth in SEE, but growth in CEE exports remains much more 
impressive. The conspicuous weakness in exporting, as well as in export structure, will be 
further analysed below. As regards foreign direct investment (FDI), the political and 
economic risks in the SEE region clearly took a strong toll as regards attractiveness to 
international investors: there was no dynamic at all in this respect until 1997 after which the 
SEE-4 seem to follow with a considerable lag the pattern of the CEE-4 (see Fig. 4). As 
regards the structure of foreign investments (Table 3), we cannot detect at this level of 
sectoral disaggregation much difference between the CEE and the SEE: in both these two 
groups of economies the main attracting sectors are manufacturing, financial intermediation, 
the trading sector and – depending on the speed of privatization – telecommunications and 
transport. 
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Figure 3 













Source: wiiw Database. 
 
Figure 4 













Source: wiiw Database. 
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Table 3 
Foreign direct investment by sectors, 2001 
stock, shares in %, end of year 
    Czech          Slovak                            
Code  Republic    Hungary   Poland   Republic   Slovenia    Albania 1)  Bosnia 1)2)  Bulgaria  3)  Croatia    Macedonia 1)4)  Romania  1) 
NACE                      Sep 1999                  




0.3    0.3    0.2    3.6   
C  Mining and quarrying  1.7    0.3 
  0.2 
  0.7 
  . 





  3.2    .    . 
 
D  Manufacturing  37.6    38.8 
  41.2 
  43.8 
  36.2 





  36.1    29.2 
5)  44.4 
5) 
E  Electricity, gas, water supply  6.1    8.9 
  2.8 
  0.2 
  0.8 





  1.0    .    . 
 
F  Construction  1.5    1.1 
  5.2 
  0.8 
  -0.04 





  1.1    4.2    4.5 
 
G  Trade, repair of motor vehicles, etc.  15.1    13.4 
  11.4 
  10.5 
  13.9 





  5.2    2.6    20.1 
 
H  Hotels and restaurants  0.7    1.7 
  1.2 
  0.7 
  0.6 





  3.1    0.2    3.1 
 
I  Transport, storage, communications  10.4    6.8 
  10.7 
  13.9 
  4.8 





  29.5    46.0    7.3 
 
J  Financial intermediation  14.8    10.9 
  23.1 
  25.9 
  28.3 





  18.9    15.3 
  . 
 
K  Real estate, renting & business act.  11.4    15.3 
  1.2 
  3.0 
  12.6 





  1.3    1.4    . 
 
L  Public administr., defence, social sec.  .    0.0 
  . 
  . 
  . 





  0.1    .    . 
 
M  Education  .    0.03 
  . 
  . 
  0.01 





  0.04    .    . 
 
N  Health and social work  .    0.1 
  . 
  0.03 
  0.03 





  .    .    . 
 
O  Other community, social & pers. activ.  0.6    1.1 
  3.1 
  0.3 
  0.4 





  0.2    .    . 
 
 Other not classified activities  .    . 
  . 
  0.004 
  2.3 





  .    1.1    17.0 
 





  100    100    100 
 
 Total, USD million  27092 
  11186 
6)  53152 
  4687 
  3209 





  4656.7    802.5    4881.6 
 
       23562 
6)                                
Notes: 1) Adjusted to NACE. - 2) Investments with more than KM 1 million capital. - 3) Cumulated inflow from 1998 only. - 4) Cumulated inflows 1997-2001. - 5) Industry total (C+D+E). - 
6) Hungarian FDI by activities is based on a survey done among the largest FDI enterprises, according to which total FDI stock in 2001 is  USD 11186 million, while the BOP arrives at 
USD  23562 million. 
Source: National statistics.  
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Further to the weaknesses in external economic relations, we show in Figs. 5 and 6 the 
state of the current accounts and the trade balance in % of GDP. In the year 2002 the 
current accounts deficit reaches more than 6% of GDP in 5 of the 7 SEE economies, while 
this is true only for Slovakia amongst the CEE economies (in that year, the average current 
account deficit in GDP amounted to –7.7% in the SEE-4 and –4.8% in the CEE-4; the 
values for Romania and Poland were –3.4% and –3.6% respectively). With the exception 
of the Polish slow-down this difference cannot be attributed to higher GDP growth in the 
SEE region and hence reflects structural weaknesses of the SEE economies.  This point 
gets substantiated if we look at the big difference between current accounts and the trade  
 
Table 4a 
Balance of payments structure in SEE, 2001 
in % GDP 
  Albania  Bosnia &  Bulgaria  Croatia  Macedonia  Romania  Serbia & 
    Herzegovina           Montenegro 
I. Current account   -6.3  -23.1  -6.2  -3.2  -6.9  -5.8  -5.9 
     A. Goods and services, net    -19.5  -32.0  -7.6  -5.4  -15.7  -8.0  -22.8 
     a. Trade balance, net   -25.0  -36.8  -11.7  -20.4  -15.2  -7.5  -27.0 
         Commodity exports, fob   7.4  19.6  37.7  24.4  33.6  28.7  19.1 
         Commodity imports, fob   -32.4  -56.4  -49.4  -44.7  -48.8  -36.1  -46.1 
     b. Services, net   5.5  4.7  4.0  15.0  -0.5  -0.5  4.2 
         1. Transport, net   .  .  -0.8  0.9  -0.5  0.0  1.7 
         2. Travel, net   .  .  4.7  14.0  -0.4  -0.2  -0.2 
         3. Other, net   .  .  0.1  0.2  0.4  -0.3  2.7 
     B. Income, net   .  5.1  -2.2  -2.7  -1.1  -0.7  -0.2 
          1. Compensation of employees, net  .  .  0.3  0.6  .  0.3  . 
          2. Investment income, net   .  .  -2.6  -3.4  .  -1.0  -0.2 
     C. Current transfers, net   13.2  3.8  3.7  4.9  10.0  2.9  11.8 
          1. General government, net   .  .  1.0  0.3  1.4  0.6  . 
          2. Other sectors, net   13.2  .  2.7  4.7  .  2.3  . 
Source: wiiw Database. 
Table 4b 
Private transfers in SEE 
  Albania  Croatia  Macedonia  Serbia &  Bosnia & 
              Montenegro  Herzegovina 
  2000  2001  2000  2001  2000  2001  2000  2001  2000  2001 
Private transfers, mn USD  543  510  983  1049  454  192  1132  1698  172  165 
Private transfers, % GDP  14.5  12.4  5.3  5.4  12.7  5.5  14  13.2  3.7  3.4 
Private transfers, per capita  173  162  224  225  224  94  136  205  45  43 
Note: Not completely comparable to balance of payments statistics in Table 4a. 
Source: IMF. 9 
Figure 5 






























































































































Source: wiiw Database. 
 
Figure 6 































































































































Source: wiiw Database. 10 
balance (in Fig. 6): the picture is here dramatically different between the SEE and the CEE 
economies as is apparent from a look at the detailed structure of the balance of payments 
for the SEE economies in Table 4a. We can see here that the very bad performance by 
SEE economies in commodities trade is partly compensated by substantial flows from 
tourism income in two of the SEE economies (Bulgaria and Croatia) and substantial 
transfers mostly from ex-patriate communities working abroad (see Table 4b). Relying on 
substantial transfers from abroad indicates that an economy is not able to produce by itself 
what it is consuming. Reliance on a substantial tourism sector for foreign exchange 
earnings is in itself not detrimental for an economy, but it adds the danger of, firstly, relying 
on a fluctuating source of income (tourism is highly sensitive to business cycle 
developments in the source countries) and, secondly, there is the possibility of the 
equivalent of a ‘Dutch disease’ phenomenon with high-income tourists contributing to a 
high domestic price level leading to an over-appreciated currency which in turn 
detrimentally affects the rest of the tradable sector; this phenomenon is clearly visible in 
Croatia. 
 
Let us next come to some structural comparisons between the CEE and the SEE 
economies. Figs. 7 and 8 show the shares of the three broad sectors, the primary, 
secondary and tertiary sectors in GDP and in (recorded) employment respectively. It is 
clear that in terms of GDP, the SEE economies have a higher share of agriculture in total 
economic activity, and interestingly, with the exception of Serbia-Montenegro and 
Romania, not much of a deficit with regard to the share of tertiary  activity. While, 
traditionally, a large share of services in an economy is taken as a sign of having reached 
a higher stage of economic development, we would argue that this would not be the right 
interpretation in this context. Rather, in line with a number of indicators already discussed 
and further indicators to be discussed below, we interpret this relatively large share of 
services in SEE economies as reflecting a weakness of industry. In fact, together with the 
general ‘falling behind’ pattern of the SEE economies over the 1990s relative to the more 
advanced transition economies, we observed a particularly sharp process in SEE of 
‘de-industrialization’ which has weakened industry to a much greater extent than was the 
case in the CEE economies. From a sectoral perspective, we view a significant recovery of 
industry in SEE as an indispensable, vital component in the path towards catching-up with 
the more successful CEE economies
2. 
 
The very weak performance of industry in SEE is further evident from a comparison of 
productivity (Fig. 9): there was a much inferior performance relative to the CEE economies 
throughout the period, with the exception of the most recent period in Romania in which 
                                                                 
2   In fact, developments in CEE were also characterized by a sharp process of de-industrialization in the early phases of 
the transition process, but this was followed – in the case of quite a few of the CEE economies – by some degree of 
recovery of industry, very often induced by or accompanied by the effects of substantial FDI inflows, strong productivity 
growth and up-grading in product quality (for more detail on this, see Landesmann, 2000). 11 
substantial productivity growth took place. Interesting are also the graphs on wage rates 
and unit labour costs (ULC) in Figs. 10 and 11, where we observe substantial wage growth 
in CEE economies which outpaces productivity growth and hence leads to rising unit 
labour costs. Wage growth is much flatter in SEE economies and so are ULC. A traditional 
interpretation of such a development would be to indicate that CEE have experienced a 
deterioration in their competitiveness compared to the SEE economies. We would counter 
such an interpretation, firstly, because it does not concur with what we have seen in terms 
of relative export developments and trade balance situations of the two ‘regions’ and, 
secondly, because the simple measurement of (labour) productivity with output at constant 
prices, neglects the substantial up-grading process which has taken place in CEE export 
industries of product quality (for more on this see wiiw, 2003, and Landesmann and 
Stehrer, 2002). The productivity, export and trade balance indicators for the SEE region 
simply indicate that the up-grading process has barely begun (with the possible exceptions 
of Romania and Bulgaria) and hence the economies remain uncompetitive in spite of 
moderate wage growth and flat unit labour costs. Fig. 12 summarizes a number of income 
or (alternatively interpreted) competitiveness indicators: it shows clearly the income and 
wage gaps between the two sets of economies. The gaps exist both at current and PPP 
exchange rates. What also emerges, is the rather special position of two economies: 
Croatia, which in terms of income indicators (but not in terms of export performance or 
commodity trade balance) clearly belongs more to the group of transition economies with 
high levels of income and wages and Slovenia, which sticks out as a high (real) income 
and wage economy amongst the CEE economies (and without problems in the trade 
balance).  
 
We now continue with a structural examination of SEE economies in terms of patterns of 
trade specialization. In the following we use two taxonomic classifications of industry 
clusters which have recently been used in the EU-wide assessment of competitiveness 
(more recently, this classification has also been used to analyse competitiveness of CEE 
economies; for this see Havlik et al., 2003). The first taxonomy clusters industries – at the 
3-digit NACE level – in terms of factor intensity and a number of industrial organization 
criteria (for details on this classification, see Peneder, 2001), while the second taxonomy 
groups industries by the relative demands for low, medium and high skilled labour. 
Figs. 13a-e and 14a-d examine the SEE and the CEE economies (in these figures CEE-8 
refers to the CEE-4 + Poland + 3 Baltic states) export structures to the European Union 
markets (the EU-15 market) in terms of these two taxonomies: the analysis shows in which 
industry clusters a country shows relatively high or low shares in its exports to the EU-15 
markets. The comparison is quite revealing: 
 12 
Figure 7 






































































































Note: Serbia and Montenegro year 1999. 










































































































Note: For Macedonia and Serbia & Montenegro employee data. 
Source: wiiw Database. 13 
Figure 9 














Source: wiiw Database. 
 
Figure 10 















Source: wiiw Database. 
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Figure 11 
















Note: SEEC-2 denotes Bulgaria and Croatia. 
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Source: wiiw Database. 15 
Figs. 13a-e show the export structures with respect to the first taxonomy. In the CEE 
countries, a trend of increasing shares of technology-driven exports, close to 30% of total 
manufacturing exports, to the EU can be observed. For most SEE countries, this figure is 
much lower at around 5% and without an observable clear trend (note that sporadic high 
technology-driven exports in Macedonia are assumed to stem from repair of aircraft). An 
opposite picture is given with exports of marketing driven industries (including food 
processing industries). Here, the CEE countries are well below 10%, while most SEE 
countries are well above 10%, with Albania even exporting around 40% in this category. 
The picture of exports of capital-intensive industries is mixed. Shares of exports in labour-
intensive industries (including textile industry) show the relatively great importance of these 
products in SEE exports. Most SEE countries export around 40% of total manufacturing 
exports to the EU in this group of products. Mainstream industries (including various types 
of machinery products) provide for about 20% of CEE exports, a value that was also 
reached by Croatia in the last years. Here, the values for the other SEE countries range 
approximately between 5% and 15%. 
 
Figs. 14a-d show the export structures with respect to the second taxonomy. In general, 
compared to the CEE countries, SEE countries tend to have lower shares of high skill 
industries in total manufacturing exports to the EU, but significantly higher shares of low-
skill industries exports. For all the SEE countries, with the exception of Croatia, low-skill 
industry exports make up well above 60% of their total manufacturing exports to the EU. 
 
As regards the competitiveness of the SEE economies relative to the CEE economies, 
there exist a host of other important dimensions in studying this issue: issues of 
macroeconomic balances (internal as well as external), institutional developments and 
progress in the transition (reform) process, deficiencies in the workings of product, labour 
and capital markets, etc. A number of these issues will be discussed in Part Two of this 
paper. However, one should not leave the analysis of the structural characteristics of the 
SEE economies relative to the CEE economies without referring to an important 
distinguishing characteristic between these two sets of economies: the size and potential 
impact of the ‘informal sector’ in the economy. 
 
Following the terminology of Schneider and Enste (2000) one can distinguish three types 
of methods to measure the size and development of the shadow economy: the direct 
approaches (e.g. sample surveys, tax auditing), the indirect approaches (e.g. national 
accounts discrepancy, official and actual labour force discrepancy, transactions approach, 
currency demand approach, physical input method) and the model approach 
(e.g. DYMIMIC). Schneider (2002) used the currency demand, the physical input and the 
DYMIMIC approach to estimate the size of the shadow economies of 110 countries. 
Table 5 shows the results for SEE and CEE countries. In most cases, SEE countries tend 
to have an unofficial sector well above 30% of GNP, while CEE countries range well below  16 
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Figure 14a 
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 18 
30% or 20% of GNP. However, Schneider admits that the figures for Albania, Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Serbia-Montenegro are unreliable due to distortions stemming from war 
and political unrest. More reliable figures for these countries would be much higher. Recent 
IMF (2003) estimates for Albania indicate that in fact the majority of economic activities is 
informal. Bajec (2001) estimates the share of the Serbian grey economy in GDP to be 
above 40%. A similar estimate for Bosnia-Herzegovina is provided by Efendic (2002). Eliat 
and Zinnes (2000) even estimated a share of the shadow economy of more than 130% of 
GDP for Macedonia in 1997. Thus, the estimated size of the informal economy can vary 
strongly depending on the method used. Nevertheless, all studies indicate that the share of 
the unofficial economy in the SEE countries is considerably higher than in CEE. We shall 
return to the role and impact of a large informal sector in SEE in Part Two of this paper. 
 
Table 5 
Shadow economy in % of GNP, 1999/2000 
Schneider (2002) using currency demand, physical input and DYMIMIC approach 
SEE   
Albania 
1)  33.4 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 
1)  34.1 
Bulgaria  36.9 
Croatia  33.4 
Romania  34.4 
Serbia-Montenegro 
1)  29.1 
CEE   
Czech Republic  19.1 
Hungary  25.1 
Poland  27.6 
Slovakia  18.9 
Slovenia  27.1 
Note: 1) Due to war and political unrest unreliable figures. 
Source: Schneider (2002), p.14. 
 
 
Conclusion to Part One 
We have tried in Part One of this paper to compare the track records of the SEE and CEE 
economies since the beginning of the transition. The picture which emerged is one of a 
clear ‘falling behind’ of the SEE region vis-à-vis the CEE region. This was clearly visible in 
aggregate developments as regards GDP growth, an abysmal employment record which 
has not even started to turn around, and extremely bad productivity and export 
performance. External economic relations reveal a fragile current account situation behind 
which are very weak commodity trade balances and a strong reliance either on transfers 
from abroad or an excess reliance on sectors (tourism) which can have negative structural 19 
and exchange rate implications. We have shown that the export structure shows a picture 
which is clearly very different from the more successful transition economies, i.e. a strong 
reliance on export commodities which rely mostly on unskilled labour and low technology 
inputs. The CEE economies have, on the other hand, made strong inroads into medium-
/high-skill and medium-/high-tech industries in their exports to the EU markets. 
 
We have also hinted at other aspects of the SEE economies, such as the large shares of 
the informal sector, which have implications for the ways in which labour, product and 
capital markets function. It is too early to deduce from this past development record that 
the SEE economies are either irreversibly stuck in a ‘development trap’ or that they are 
about to embark upon a development path rather similar to the more successful transition 
economies, only with a considerable time lag but with potentially faster speed. In our 
opinion, the ‘lock in’ to an EU accession scenario is extremely important as to which 
developmental path is the more likely to emerge over the next few years. We expect that in 
many respects, we shall observe a lot of differentiation in speeds and patterns of 
development across the region. The ‘external anchor’ is important, but not solely decisive. 
Internal behavioural, structural and policy responses are at least as important. We shall 
turn to these as well as to specific issues regarding the individual countries’ paths towards 




Sustainability, growth and integration with the EU 
Introduction 
As a consequence of a less than successful transition and of violent and other political 
conflicts, the SEE countries still face some significant problems in sustaining their 
macroeconomic stability and in ensuring sustainable growth. As for macroeconomic 
stability, there are problems with the external and fiscal balances and with the levels of 
employment and unemployment. 
 
Growth is elusive because some of the most important sources of growth are lacking, most 
importantly exports and investments. The SEE countries have either lost their 
competitiveness or failed to make gains in it. Parallel to that, the integration of South East 
Europe with the European Union has been delayed. To catch up, the SEE countries need 




Three balances are important here: external, fiscal and resource, i.e., in the last case 




As seen from the figures presented in Part One, unlike the Central European transition 
economies, those  in South East Europe have failed to develop a growing export sector. 
There are various causes for this, but it suffices to point out that Hungary now exports 
much more than the Balkans or Southeast Europe (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, Romania) as a whole. Imports, 
however, have forged ahead in the Balkans, so that the trade deficit is quite high. The 
deficit in the current account is smaller because of the surpluses that the SEE countries as 
a rule run in services and income balances as well as on transfers (see Tables 4a and b for 
details). Still, as a rule, current account deficits tend to be high, though higher in some 
countries than in others. This leads to the growing foreign debt. 
 
The dynamics of growth of foreign debt in South East Europe tends to depend on at least 
three factors. Foreign debt tends to increase faster if a country is not initially very much 
indebted. The same happens if a country is not fully servicing its inherited debt. Usually, at 
the beginning of transition, the inherited debt is restructured with a certain grace period, 
during which the indebtedness tends to grow. Finally, the stock of debt tends to stagnate if 
a country is heavily indebted and if foreign direct investments are flowing in. Thus, Balkan 
countries are vulnerable to increases in the debt service, for whatever reason, and to the 
slowdown of foreign direct investments. In other words, Balkan’s current approach to 
foreign debt is sustainable if the costs of borrowing do not deteriorate and there is a steady 
inflow of foreign direct investments. 
 
Another way to look at the issue of debt sustainability is to determine the expected 
developments of the debt to GDP or debt to export ratios. Assuming the preservation of the 
desired level of reserves, the debt to GDP ratio can remain constant if the interest rate on 
the debt is the same as the growth rate of the GDP. Then refinancing the whole debt will 
keep the debt to GDP ratio at the same level. Otherwise, the share of debt increases. To 
keep the debt to GDP ratio constant, i.e., sustainable at an appropriate level, the difference 
between the interest rate and the growth rate should be repaid. For instance, if the growth 
rate is 4% and the interest on the foreign debt is 6%, that means that the interest of 2% 
should be repaid. If the debt to GDP ratio is 50%, that means that 1% of GDP should be 
repaid every year to keep the debt level constant. Clearly, every fall in the growth rate will 
lead to the need to repay more. Otherwise, the debt will grow. 21 
Figure 15a 
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Figure 15b 






























































































Note: * projections;  
AL, MK and YU: Short-term ext. debt % reserves, YU 2002: Serbia only. 
Source: IMF and national statistics. 














































































































Note: * projections;  
Montenegro: Public debt service % exports. 
Sources: IMF and national statistics. 
 
This has implications for the trade balance (and thus the current account). If the debt is 
refinanced except for the difference between the interest rate and GDP growth, that 
difference stands also for the necessary surplus in the current account or the trade balance 
that is needed to keep the debt to GDP ratio constant. Otherwise, debt grows faster than 
GDP and becomes eventually unsustainable. 
 
In the case of the SEE economies, the seeds of the lack of sustainability are certainly 
there. There is no doubt that the interest rates they have to accept are higher than their 
rates of growth. They also run high trade and current account deficits. Thus, as already 
mentioned, their debt to GDP ratios are held down only with the higher inflows of foreign 
direct investments. Otherwise, they have a tendency to grow. Thus, at this moment, the 
debts can be financed, but they are basically not sustainable under normal conditions.  
 
It is hard to judge the severity of the problem of indebtedness. That is because it is not 
clear what should be the debt level at which its ratio to GDP should be stabilized. 
Conventionally, a ratio of 60% has been in use. Three countries are above that threshold: 
Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro and Croatia. Some have suggested a ratio of 30%, 
because of the unreliability of the estimates of the GDP, in which case most of the SEE 
countries would be above that threshold. 23 
Perhaps more reliable measures are debt to export and debt service to export ratios. 
Those are, in most cases, less worrisome. In some cases, for instance Croatia and Serbia, 
the debt service to export ratio is quite high (in the case of Serbia this is not evident from 
the current data because of the grace period which expires in 2006 when the debt service 
to export ratio will jump to at least 25%). Also, the improvement that can be observed in 
some cases is the consequence of the recovery of exports of services (mainly tourism), 
which leads to a faster growth of exports of goods and services than of the debt service. 
However, this growth will inevitably slow down  and the debt burden will continue to 
increase. 
 
Some significant aid is still flowing into the Balkans and some countries or territories are 
still using credits at concessionary interest rates. At commercial interest rates, their debts 
would probably prove to be hard to service over a longer period of time. In any case, there 
is clearly a foreign debt problem, though it is not altogether easy to determine how severe it 
is at the moment. It should be reiterated, however, that bad export performance is certainly 




Apart from debt sustainability, there is the issue of fiscal sustainability, which is probably 
even more important from the developmental point of view. The fiscal picture of the Balkan 
economies can be summarized in the following way. Most of the countries have rather high 
public expenditure to GDP ratios. In some cases, they go over 50%. As a consequence, 
they have high public revenue to GDP ratios that, however, fall short of expenditures 
implying significant general government deficits. Balkan states, with some exceptions, 
spend a lot on wages and salaries. In some cases, quite a lot is spent on the military and 
the security forces in general. Also, they allocate significant resources to subsidies and 
grants. Finally, in some cases, they have to make significant interest payments on the 
public debt. 
 
The real state of public finances is difficult to determine because of the presence of 
significant contingent fiscal liabilities, or fiscal risks. In a number of Balkan economies, the 
state had to take over costs of restructuring of various sectors, for instance of the banking 
sector or of parts of the state owned enterprises. These fiscal risks are hard to assess. In 
some cases, the state issues guarantees and these can be priced. In the case of the 
collapse of the banking system, as has happened in a number of Balkan economies, this is 
much more difficult to price ahead of the time of the collapse. The same is the case with 
the public services and with the utilities. It can be generally assumed that the state of the 
fiscal sector is much more problematic than the data on revenues and expenditures would 
suggest. 
 24 
In most cases, with some exceptions, primary surplus is negative. In other words, general 
government is in deficit even if interest payments on the public debt are left out. Assuming 
that the deficit is financed from borrowing, stability requires that the deficit is not larger than 
the additional GDP. Otherwise, debt will grow faster than the GDP. Again, as in the case of 
foreign debt, that would imply ever larger debt repayments in order to keep the stock of 
debt at an acceptable level. At the moment, this consequence is mitigated by a high, 
though diminishing, supply of aid. It can be expected that some forms of budget support 
will be continued in the future, partly from the EU. More on that later. 
 
This state of affairs – high share of public expenditures in the GDP and persistent deficit – 
means that taxes will have to be kept high or expenditures will have to be reduced. The 
growth consequences of rising taxes are most probably negative, not only because of the 
high fiscal burden but also because of the associated misallocation of resources. This 




Thus, cutting spending is a preferable policy. Some significant savings can be achieved by 
spending much less on security, i.e., by making use o f the peace dividend. Other 
restructurings of the public sector can also improve the fiscal balance. By contrast, not very 
much can be done about social security, though there are significant inefficiencies to be 
found there, especially in the pension system. Still, these expenditures will remain high 
because the population in the Balkans, with the exception of the Albanian and the Muslim 
one, is rather old.  
 
States in the Balkans do not invest much. This is because of the pressure of current 
expenditures  and because of the existence of budget deficits that put a limit to new 
borrowing. Even in the cases in which external financing is available, the necessary 
domestic co-financing is hard to come by. This impedes the reconstruction of the 
infrastructure and many other types of investments that are connected with modernization.  
 
Thus, apart from the lack of sustainability of fiscal balances, expenditures are biased 
towards consumption and away from investments, as well as towards the older rather than 
younger generation. That has significant consequences for economic development and 
also for outward migration. However, there are also other factors that play a role in these 
developments. 
 
                                                                 
3   More on that in Gligorov (2000). 25 
Figure 16a 
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Figure 16b 
Overall fiscal balance,  



































































































































Notes: *) Projections.  
For Serbia as percentage of the GDP of Serbia and Montenegro. For the entities in B&H revenues with grants. 
Sources: IMF and national statistics. 
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Table 6 
General government spending on wages and salaries, % GDP 




Albania               5.6               5.2               5.0 
Bulgaria               3.9               3.9               3.9 
Croatia              11.7              11.1              10.5 
Romania               5.0               5.0               4.9 
Serbia and Montenegro              9.5              10.4               10.2 
   Serbia               8.5               9.5               9.4 
   Montenegro   9.9               10.4   10.4 
Slovenia              10.0              10.2   . 
CEEC average               6.1   .   . 
Note: Serbian and Montenegrin revenues are shares of Serbia's and Montenegro's GDP respectively. S&M revenues 
are a share of S&M GDP. 
Sources: IMF and national statistics; wiiw estimates. 
Table 7 
Subsidies and transfers, % GDP 




Albania  8.9  9.0 8.6 
Bulgaria  16.2  16.4 17.0 
Croatia  20.8  20.6 20.2 
Romania  14.5  14.6 14.5 
Serbia and Montenegro  19.5  23.8 22.6 
   Serbia  17.8  22.5 21.2 
   Montenegro  20.7  20.1 18.7 
Slovenia  20.0  20.4 . 
CEEC average  18.3  . . 
Note: Serbian and Montenegrin revenues are shares of Serbia's and Montenegro's GDP respectively. S&M revenues 
are a share of S&M GDP. 
Sources: IMF and national statistics; wiiw estimates. 
 
 
Employment and unemployment 
In transition, an increase in unemployment can be expected. In the canonical case, 
employment falls more slowly than output, but then recovers more slowly too because, in 
the former instance, the predominant employment is still in the state sector and may 
perform a social or political purpose, while in the latter period employment is already mostly 
in the private sector, where the concerns over the increase of productivity predominate. 
This mostly happened in the Balkans too, though the violent conflicts contributed to the 
dynamics significantly. Thus, the fall in output and in employment was quite steep and the 27 
recovery both of output and of employment was delayed. As a consequence and as 
already discussed in Part One, employment has remained low and unemployment high 
and in some cases very high. 
 
Statistics on employment and unemployment in the Balkans is not reliable. This is because 
of the existence of a large informal sector. One indication is the discrepancy between 
registered unemployment and that found in labour surveys. In the former Yugoslavia 
countries, the difference can be as much as 10% or even 20% of the labour force. If one 
assumes that there are also those who are registered as employed but are working in the 
informal economy – full time or as moonlighting – then the size of the informal sector, due 
to informal employment only, can be assessed to be significant, though not necessarily all 
that large. The estimates appearing in Table 5 above may be exaggerated. There is no 
doubt that the share of the informal economy is higher in SEEC than in CEEC. However, 
the levels of unaccounted for employment and some common sense assumptions about 
the productivity of that sector do not support the conclusion that the informal sector is 
practically the largest sector of the economy (Albania and Kosovo may be exceptions). 
 
The problem with the labour markets in the Balkans is that they are not efficient in the 
sense that there is a high likelihood that labour is misallocated both in the formal and in the 
informal economy. The informal economy always implies tax evasion, though that may not 
be the reason why it emerges. Thus, it is a subsidized sector. The labour employed is at 
least to some extent misallocated, because the sector would look differently if it were 
paying taxes. The formal economy, on the other hand, is also either subsidized or is still 
facing somewhat softer budget constraints. It is also probably still hoarding labour. Thus, at 
least some of the labour in that sector is misallocated. 
 
If that is right, then there is still significant reallocation of labour that will have to take place. 
The misallocated labour in both sectors would have to move to the new private formal 
sector.  The aggregate effect of this reallocation is not easy to determine with some 
certainty. What can be said, however, is that the usual understanding of the process of 
transition as that of reallocation of labour from the state to the private sector would have to 
be augmented with reallocation via the informal sector, with the additional risk of the 
economy being stuck in a low-development equilibrium – a characteristic of the 'transition 




Sources of growth 
The analysis of imbalances is important for the understanding of the sources of growth in 
the past and those that may be important in the future. The episodes of growth in the 
Balkans have been the consequence of one or more of the following: 28 
-  post-conflict reconstruction, 
-  increased consumption, and 
-  increased investment, in a number of cases public, but in some cases foreign direct 
investment 
 
Only in the last case, and only when growth was based on foreign investments, did it not 
lead to imbalances with possible negative growth consequences. Even in these cases, the 
decisive fact was the target of foreign direct investments. In most cases in the Balkans, 
foreign direct investments have targeted sectors like telecommunications, banking and 
some industries with predominantly domestic markets (breweries, tobacco, oil, energy). 
Their contribution to the efficiency of resource allocation has been significant, but not so 
much to sustainable growth. 
 
A good example is the banking sector. The share of foreign owned banks in the Balkans is 
higher than in Central Europe. However, their contribution to the growth of output has been 
rather modest. The main reason is that the banks are ready to finance consumption, but to 
a much lesser extent investment. This became quite clear during the euro conversion in 
2002 when the liquidity of the banks in many countries increased quite significantly. Most 
of it went to loans to households, which were spent mostly on durable consumption goods. 
That contributed to the increase in imports, but had little effect on the growth of output. 
 
Comparing sources of growth in Central European transition countries with those in the 
Balkans, it seems reasonably clear that export growth is quite important. Most of the 
Balkan economies are small, one exception being Romania. Therefore, probably the best 
strategy for growth is that of market integration. Quite contrary to that, Balkan economies 
tended to increase market disintegration. The introduction of sanctions and embargoes 
contributed to that. The situation started to change after the war in Kosovo in 1999. Indeed, 
since then, the Balkans have been doing better, with the exception of Macedonia which 
went through a severe ethnic conflict and is still recovering from it. 
 
Barriers to trade, however, are still significant. Probably the more important ones are the 
non-tariff barriers. If one looks at the political barriers, imposed in one way or another, as 
prohibitively high non-tariff barriers, i.e., zero-quotas to trade between two countries and 
territories, it becomes clear that barriers to trade in the Balkans are quite high. This still 
accounts for low levels of trade within Bosnia and Herzegovina, between Serbia and 
Kosovo and between Serbia and Croatia (see Christie, 2002). 
 
To address the tariff barriers, the Balkan countries have signed a series of bilateral free 
trade agreements. The next step is the creation of the Southeast European Free Trade 
Area (SEEFTA). In addition, and more importantly, the European Union has unilaterally 
removed all tariff and most non-tariff barriers to imports from the Western Balkans (Albania, 29 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and Serbia and Montenegro). These 
measures have proved to be helpful, though no dramatic increases in foreign trade have 
happened yet. Still, there is no doubt that the issue of market access is quite important for 
sustained and faster growth in the Balkans. 
 
The same may be said of enterprise restructuring. Unlike in Central European economies, 
a new private sector has not sprung up in the Balkans, at least not to the extent that had 
been expected, except for the one to be found in the informal economy. The small and 
medium-size sector that has developed, either in the formal or in the informal economy, 
has concentrated mainly on trade and other services. The growth of a new private sector in 
industry has been much less pronounced, with some exceptions.  
 
As the new private sector has failed to emerge quickly, the brunt of the enterprise sector, 
except for the informal economy, has remained with the former state-owned (or socially 
owned, in the case of former Yugoslavian countries) sector. Its performance, however, has 
depended very much on the speed of privatization, as the restructuring and the 
revitalization of the state and socially owned enterprises has not proved to be a big 
success. Privatization, however, has in a number of cases been guided by special interests 
and not by the increase in the efficiency of the use of resources. Thus, the post-
privatization process, which has proved to be rather slow, should bring about the needed 
improvements in ownership and the structure of corporate governance. 
 
Competition policy could contribute to the restructuring of enterprises. The state sector is 
populated by monopolies, but the structure of the privatized sector and even of the informal 
economy is not necessarily one that could be associated with a free market economy. To 
an extent, the combination of post-socialist structures with the lack of rule of law keep the 
incentives for exit low and  the costs   of  entry  high. This has been changing with the 
increased openness of Balkan economies, but the process is slow and is standing in the 
way of changes in the structure of the economy. 
 
Partly this is so because of the large share of the informal economy. Apart from the 
elements of informality associated with the state sector and with the private sector, that is 
able to extract special concessions from the authorities in exchange for bribes, the rest of 
the informal economy is mostly that of small and medium size firms in low value added 
sectors. Informality puts a cap on the size of firms, except in the case of so-called captured 
states. Even if there is no rule of law, the sheer fact of informality works against large scale 
production. Thus, there are limits to growth of the informal economy. 
 
As argued here, sustained growth can probably be based on the growth of exports. There, 
the issue of competitiveness comes in. Unlike the more successful Central European 
transition economies, most Balkan economies adopted one or the other version of a fixed 30 
exchange rate. This was a consequence of the lack of belief in the ability of the monetary 
authorities to withstand pressures to monetize the fiscal deficit. Apart from other problems 
that this has brought about, the depressed exports and runaway imports are probably the 
most serious ones. There is a hope that real restructuring would eventually validate the 
adopted exchange rate policy, but that has not really happened yet. In any case, there is 
no doubt that competitiveness is the key condition of sustained growth and eventual 




The Balkans are more integrated with the EU than with itself. EU is the most important 
trading partner, even in the cases of landlocked countries or territories of the Balkans (e.g., 
Serbia, Macedonia, Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina). Assuming an export based growth 
strategy for the Balkans, that means that exports to the EU will play the key role in it, as it 
has in the case of the Central European transition economies. This is true not only of 
goods but also of services, as the Balkans have comparative advantages in tourism, in 
transport and perhaps in some other sectors too. Most of these services are exported to 
the EU member states. 
 
The EU is also the main investor in the region. Its importance will only increase with the 
current enlargement as Hungary and Slovenia have been investing in the region and will 
continue to do so. Currently, these investments are still rather low (see Table 3), partly 
because of the uncertainty about the prospects of EU integration of this region. These 
uncertainties are still rather high, as the repeated declarations that the Balkans will join the 
EU at some point in the future have not been matched with real progress in the process of 
integration. 
 
The EU plays an important role as a source of factor incomes and transfers (see Tables 4a 
and b). Due to the continuous migration from the Balkans, remittances, wages and 
pensions, are rather crucial for the sustainability of the balance of payments. Private 
transfers as a whole amount to from 5% in Croatia to over 10% in almost all the other 
Western Balkan countries. Data for Bosnia and Herzegovina and reported inflows are 
much lower than those that could reasonably be expected. Lately, increases in private 
transfers have been reported for Romania and Bulgaria too. Most of these originate in the 
EU, though in some cases the share of money coming in from overseas is also quite 
significant. 
 
Finally, the EU is the main source of aid and public transfers. In the Western Balkans, most 
of these inflows have been connected with reconstruction and humanitarian aid. In other 
Balkan countries, the public transfers have increasingly been connected with the transition 
and with EU integration. In the future, the EU is likely to increase its financial support to the 31 
Balkans and to target the macroeconomic stability, employment growth and institutional 
changes required for EU integration. 
 
Clearly, the Balkans are dependent on, if not integrated with, the EU. The dependency 
goes beyond the economic relations. The EU plays a quite significant political role, in some 
cases a direct one, e.g., in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia and Serbia and 
Montenegro. Both the economic and the political role would be significantly helped with an 
appropriate strategy of EU integration. Currently the EU is committed to the enlargement 
process for the candidate countries and to the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) 
for the so-called Western Balkan countries
4 that it adopted in 1999. The latter consists of a 
Stabilization and Association Agreement  (SAA) that is similar but not identical to the 
Europe Agreements. At the moment, the relations of SEEC and the EU are as follows: 
 
–  Candidates for membership: Bulgaria and Romania 
–  SAAs: Macedonia and Croatia (signed with the EU and in the process of ratification by 
the individual member states) 
–  Cooperation agreement: Albania, SAA negotiations in progress 
–  No contractual relations: Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and Montenegro, with 
SAAs to be offered some time in the future 
5 
 
This strategy is currently under revision. Probably the first item in the new strategy has to 
be a clear commitment on both sides to the process of integration. The next is the lead that 
the EU needs to take. This is both necessary and difficult to expect. There are two reasons 
why this is the case. 
 
On the one hand, the Balkan countries have been slow to adopt an EU integration agenda, 
partly because of internal and partly because of regional problems they have faced. In the 
case of the latter, i.e., the regional problems, there have been few if any regional initiatives 
originating from the region itself. Thus, true to the concept of Balkanization, the region has 
been unable to come up with a regional will, that is with a regional recognition of the 
advantages of EU integration. 
 
On the other hand, the benefits of Balkan integration in the EU are rather asymmetric. The 
benefits for the Balkans outweigh significantly those of the EU. This is evident when the 
extent of economic dependence of the Balkans on the EU is taken into account. Thus, it 
cannot be expected, in normal circumstances, that the EU would be interested in pushing 
for the speeded-up integration of the Balkans into the EU. 
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Thus, when it comes to Balkan integration into the EU, there are two types of failures to 
confront. One is connected with Balkanization, which precludes regional cooperation. The 
other is the failure of the EU to emerge as a leader in this process because of the small 
benefits that the EU enlargement in the Balkans would bring about. 
 
To deal with these two types of failures, the combined process of regional cum EU 
integration has been devised. In other words, in order for the individual countries to qualify 
for an upgrade in their relationship with the EU, they have to make progress in regional 
cooperation. This strategy has had few results until recently. As a consequence of EU 
eastern enlargement and also because of the political changes in the Balkans, things have 
started to change, at least at the level of political will. Thus, most countries and territories in 
the Balkans now put their EU integration ahead of other political interests. This puts the 
pressure on the EU to start thinking about Balkan enlargement more operationally. 
 
This leads to the following state of affairs. On the one hand, the most pressing economic 
and political problems of the Balkans are still there and are far from being resolved. On the 
other hand, EU accession has come to be seen as the unique instrument for the resolution 
of these problems. This r elates as much to development and growth as to political 
settlements and to social issues. Thus, a speed-up in the process of EU Balkan 
enlargement can be expected. 
 
The key element of the possible new strategy will be the treatment of the Balkan countries 
as de facto candidates for membership.
6 That would imply the use of instruments that 
enable the EU to have a more pronounced role in the settlement of outstanding political 
issues, to extend more resources, both financial and technical, and to contribute to the 
economic recovery of the region through better access to EU markets and increased 
investments from the EU. 
 
The implementation of this strategy would require a lot of innovative thinking on the side of 
the EU and also on the side of the Balkan countries. Here some of the main economic 
issues will be mentioned.  
 
The key issue is that of trade within the region and with the EU. Current arrangements that 
rely on association agreements with the EU and on bilateral trade agreements between 
Southeast European countries is full of distortions. In view of the central importance of the 
EU market for the Balkan economies, and of their lack of competitiveness, further 
measures of unilateral trade liberalization on the EU side would be useful along with 
multilateral trade liberalization within the region.  
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As for the related issue of large inflows of investments, a lowering of the country-specific 
and regional non-commercial risks would be desirable. As the banking sector in the 
Balkans is dominated by banks from the EU member states, some scheme of loan 
guarantees  should not be difficult to devise. 
 
On the macroeconomic side, the EU has to rethink its role both on the fiscal and on the 
monetary side. Fiscal sustainability is probably the key issue. As for monetary policy, in 
most Balkan countries and territories, the euro is used more than the domestic currency. 
Because of that, most countries have adopted one or the other version of the fixed 
exchange rate, which has  proved to be good for price stability but has contributed 
negatively to the region’s competitiveness. Thus, the design of an appropriate monetary 
and exchange rate  policy is a task yet to be tackled. 
 
To address the microeconomic problems, the instruments of institution building and micro-
financing will have to be used. The reliance on public resources, which may turn out to be 
the preferred approach, may not be the best one. Public money tends to be misused as a 
rule, and especially in the Balkans. Thus, the key issue will probably be the availability of 
private money and of the mechanism of its mobilization and utilization. In the end, it is the 
inflow of foreign investments and export growth that should lead to the reversal of the 
process of divergence to one of convergence. 
 
 
Conclusions to Part Two 
Transition has meant divergence for the SEE countries. They have not succeeded in 
improving their competitiveness and have not moved on to a path of sustainable growth. 
The situation has been improving since 2000, but the return of growth has been 
accompanied by the persistence of macroeconomic disequilibria. Also, in most cases, 
growth has been driven by consumption rather than by investment and exports. Thus, 
there are still considerable problems on the way to convergence. These would be easier to 
address if the process of EU integration was speeded up. The Balkans are quite 
dependent on the EU both economically and politically. Thus, unlike in other cases where 
convergence preceded integration, the opposite strategy may be the preferred one in the 
Balkans. 
 
We have emphasized in this paper that one of the striking features of the Balkan transition 
is the stagnation or slow recovery of exports even in periods when growth is accelerating. 
This was noted early on
7 and the need for both regional and integration with the EU market 
is routinely stressed. Indeed, after 1999 the EU has unilaterally removed most of the tariffs 
(including agricultural products) for exports from the Western Balkans while those with the 
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candidate countries (Bulgaria and Romania) are quite low already. The results so far have 
not been all that remarkable. Still, this measure of liberalization has led to a process of 
regional liberalization of trade as all countries have signed bilateral free trade agreements. 
They should lead to the creation of a free trade area in the near future. Tackling the issue 
of non-tariff barriers to trade will be vital (see below). 
 
Access to markets is important, but so is competitiveness. Most of the Balkans pursues a 
fixed exchange rate policy. Bulgaria and Bosnia and Herzegovina have currency boards 
while Kosovo and Montenegro use the euro. Croatia, Macedonia and Serbia peg their 
currencies to the euro more or less strictly. Albania and Romania have more flexible 
exchange rate policies. How much fixed exchange rates have contributed to the loss of 
competitiveness is hard to determine, though it seems reasonable to assume that the 
influence has been significant. 
 
Low employment and high unemployment are certainly the main economic problems in the 
Balkans. Linked to these, a large shadow economy is associated. That distorts product 
markets also. Growth of the new private sector is slow because the barriers to entry into 
both legal and shadow economies are quite high. The risks to investments being high, 
banks do not finance business activity much. Furthermore, FDI is only recently increasing, 
though there are signs that the inflow is decreasing once the more profitable firms and 
sectors are privatized. 
 
There is clearly no simple answer to furthering the process of economic development of 
the Balkans. Still, with the risk of violent conflicts being rather low, political and economic 
opportunities are improving. The key that those would not be missed is the radically 
enhanced prospect of EU integration. There are three reasons why that is so: 
–  the internal political will in the Balkan countries is often weak, 
–  the regional political will is also quite weak, 
–  the EU is politically and economically very much involved in the region. 
 
Thus, assuming that the EU wants to integrate this region, it should take the lead in its 
development. The best development instrument that the EU has is exactly that of 
integration. It is now decided that Southeast Europe or the Balkans will accede to the EU 
some time in the future. Therefore, the real issue is what the EU should do to use the 
prospect of integration as an instrument of Balkan development. 
 
Clearly, the main problems are connected with trade, employment and fiscal expenditures. 
 
The EU is the main trading partner for the majority of the Balkan economies and the 
importance of its market will only grow. This has been realized, but the unilateral trade 35 
liberalization should be supplemented with a similar removal of non-tariff barriers. When it 
comes to remaining protective measures, those are a significant cost for the Balkans and 
an insignificant benefit for the EU. Standards, however, could be improved through 
technical assistance, which could also be used to increase the level of information about 
the way EU markets could be accessed. 
 
In addition, barriers to investments should be lowered. A characteristic feature of most of 
the Balkans is the dominance of foreign banks, mostly originating from the EU member 
states. EU presence in the financial markets will further increase with the accession of 
Slovenia and Hungary. Banks in the Balkans do not lend very much to businesses, 
especially small and medium-size ones. This is mostly because the risks are assessed to 
be too high. Those could be addressed in two ways. For one, there must be a way to 
insure investment and commercial risks. For another, international financial institutions 
should be able to support the opening up of local banks, as the lack of specific knowledge 
is often the reason that the bigger foreign-owned banks do not lend to small and medium-
size enterprises.  
 
These suggestions are premised on the belief that private investments are the key to 
development of the Balkans. Such investments could be reassured with appropriate public 
financial support. There is clearly the need to support infrastructure projects as a basic 
development tool. Beyond that, investments in institution-building are necessary. Aid and 
outright budget support – the instrument mostly used in the last decade or so – should be 
gradually phased out while the support for the strengthening of public governance and 
restructuring should be increased. Following from this, the EU should get more involved in 
reforms in the Balkans and even in some aspects of fiscal management both on the central 
and on the local level. 
 
These instruments of speeded integration cannot be seen outside of the political 
challenges and changes that this region faces, but those have been left out in this analysis 
(see further on this, Gligorov, 2003). 36 
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External debt indicators 
    2001  2002* 2003* 
Albania  External debt % GDP  28.7  24.7 25.5 
 External debt % Exports  140.7  138.8 141.9 
 Short term ext. debt % Reserves  2.6  6.2 6.7 
 Ext. debt service % Exports  3.9  7.8 7.1 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  External debt % GDP  53.2  51.6 50.6 
 External debt % Exports  186.4  184.9 179.8 
 External debt % Reserves  207.0  224.3 231.9 
 Ext. debt service % Exports  5.8  8.3 10 
Bulgaria  External debt % GDP             78.3             70.3             64.8 
 External debt % Exports           140.9           137.1           131.5 
 External debt % Reserves           296.6   .   . 
 Ext. debt service % Exports   .   .   . 
Croatia  External debt % GDP             57.9             67.9   . 
 External debt % Exports           117.5           144.5   . 
 External debt % Reserves           240.6           259.0   . 
 Ext. debt service % Exports             24.4             25.9   . 
Macedonia  External debt % GDP             40.7             42.4   . 
 External debt % Exports           115.6           126.3   . 
 Short term ext. debt % Reserves             32.4             21.9   . 
 Ext. debt service % Exports             19.0             11.9   . 
Romania  External debt % GDP             29.6             28.6   . 
 External debt % Exports             88.1             83.9   . 
 External debt % Reserves           240.6           190.8   . 
 Ext. debt service % Exports               4.4               4.5   . 
Serbia and Montenegro  External debt % GDP           113.7   .   . 
 External debt % Exports           441.4   .   . 
 Short term ext. debt % Reserves           120.1   .   . 
 Ext. debt service % Exports               1.8   .   . 
Serbia External debt % GDP   .           100.0   . 
 External debt % Exports   .           391.7   . 
 External debt % Reserves   .           529.8   . 
 Ext. debt service % Exports   .               2.0   . 
Montenegro External debt % GDP   .             41.9   . 
  External debt % Exports   .           108.6   . 
  External debt % Reserves   .   .   . 
  Public debt service % Exports   .             10.4   . 
Note: *) Projections 
Sources: IMF and national statistics. 38 
Table A-2 
General government data in % of GDP 
    2001  2002* 2003* 
Albania  Revenues  23.0  23.5 24.4 
 Expenditures  31.5  31.0 31.0 
 Overall balance  -8.5  -7.5 -6.6 
 Interest payments  4.3  3.7 3.8 
 Primary balance  -4.2  -3.8 -2.8 
 Defence expenditure  1.1  . . 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  Revenues  44.4  46.8 46.5 
 Expenditures  57.5  56.2 52.6 
 Overall balance  -13.2  -9.4 -6.1 
 Interest payments  1.2  1.1 1.1 
 Primary balance  -12.0  -8.3 -5.0 
Federation BiH Revenues  45.9  44.1 44.3 
 Expenditures  47.6  46.3 43.7 
 Overall balance  -1.7  -2.2 0.6 
 Defence expenditure  4.1  5.1 3.4 
Republika Srpska Revenues  48.1  55.4 54.4 
 Expenditures  56.2  56.2 53.4 
 Overall balance  -8.1  -0.8 -1.0 
 Defence expenditure  2.1  2.9 2.9 
Bulgaria  Revenues  37.7  36.0 35.6 
 Expenditures  38.6  36.7 36.3 
 Overall balance  -0.9  -0.7 -0.7 
 Interest payments  3.7  2.2 2.4 
 Primary balance  2.8  1.5 1.7 
 Defence expenditure  3.2  3.4 3.3 
Croatia  Revenues  44.7  45.4 45.0 
 Expenditures  51.5  51.5 50.0 
 Overall balance  -6.8  -6.1 -5.0 
 Interest payments  2.2  2.3 2.5 
 Primary balance  -4.6  -3.8 -2.5 
Macedonia  Revenues  34.4  35.9 32.9 
 Expenditures  41.6  41.7 35.3 
 Overall balance  -7.2  -5.8 -2.5 
 Interest payments  1.9  1.5 1.2 
 Primary balance  -5.3  -4.3 -1.3 
 Defence expenditure  10.3  5.9 . 
Romania  Revenues  30.5  30.2 30.4 
 Expenditures  33.7  33.1 33.1 
 Overall balance  -3.2  -2.9 -2.7 
 Interest payments  3.9  3.2 2.9 
 Primary balance  0.7  0.3 0.2 
Serbia and Montenegro  Revenues  38.9  42.5 40.5 
 Expenditures  40.2  47.5 45.1 
 Overall balance  -1.3  -5.0 -4.5 
 Interest payments  0.7  1.0 1.1 
 Primary balance  -0.6  -4.0 -3.4 
Serbia Revenues  35.9  40.0 38.0 
 Expenditures  36.8  44.7 42.1 
 Overall balance  -1.0  -4.7 -4.1 
 Interest payments  0.7  0.9 1.0 
 Primary balance  -0.3  -3.8 -3.1 
Montenegro Revenues  38.0  36.5 36.9 
 Expenditures  42.3  40.6 42.5 
 Overall balance  -4.7  -4.0 -5.6 
 Interest payments  0.1  1.2 1.3 
 Primary balance  -4.6  -3.0 -4.3 
Notes: *) Projections. For Serbia as percentage of the GDP of Serbia and Montenegro. For the entities in B&H revenues with grants. 
Sources: IMF and national statistics. 